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Mathematicians are one over on the physicists in that they already have
a unified theory of mathematics, namely set theory. Unfortunately the
plethora of independence results since the invention of forcing has taken
away some of the luster of set theory in the eyes of many mathematicians.
Will man’s knowledge of mathematical truth be forever limited to those
theorems derivable from the standard axioms of set theory, ZFC? This
author does not think so, and in fact he feels there is a schema concerning
non-constructible sets which is a very natural candidate for being considered
as part of the axioms of set theory. To understand the motivation why, let
us take a very short look back at the history of the development of math-
ematics. Mathematics began with the study of mathematical objects very
physical and concrete in nature and has progressed to the study of things
completely imaginary and abstract. Most mathematicians now accept these
objects as as mathematically legitimate as any of their more concrete coun-
terparts. It is enough that these objects are consistently imaginable, i.e.,
exist in the world of set theory. Applying the same intuition to set theory
itself, we should accept as sets as many that we can whose existence are
consistent with ZFC. Of course this is only a vague notion, but knowl-
edge of set theory so far, namely of the existence of L provides a good
starting point. What sets can we consistently imagine beyond L? Since by
forcing one can prove the consistency of ZFC with the existence of non-
constructible sets and as L is absolute, with these forcing extensions of L
you have consistently imagined more sets in a way which satisfies the vague
notion mentioned above. The problem is which forcing extensions should
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you consider as part of the universe? But there is no problem, because if you
prove the consistency of the existence of some L generic subset of a par-
tially ordered set P ∈ L with ZFC, then P must be describable and we
can easily prove the consistency of ZFC with the existence of L generic
subsets of P for every P definible in L. Namely, the axiom schema IFSL
(For internal forcing schema over L) defined below is consistent with ZFC.
Definition 0.1 IFSL is the axiom schema which says for every formula
φ(x), if L |= there is a unique partial order P such that φ(P ), then there
is a L generic subset of P in the universe V.
IFSL is a natural closure condition on a universe of set theory. Given
a class model of ZFC which has no inner class model of the form L[G]
for some partial order P definable in L, we can (by forcing) consistently
imagine expanding the model to include such a class. Conversely, no class
model of ZFC + IFSL can be contained in a class model of ZFC which
does not satisfy IFSL.
Theorem 0.2 If there is a sequence 〈Mn | n < ω〉 of transitive models
with Mn |= ZFCn where ZFC =
⋃
n∈ω
ZFCn, then Con(ZFC + IFSL)
proof By the compactness theorem and forcing.
Theorem 0.3 If V is a model of ZFC, then V |= IFSL if and only if
V |= every set definable in L is countable.
proof Certainly if every set definable in L is countable, then every par-
tially ordered set definable in L is countable, so therefore is the set of dense
subsets of P in L countable and so P has generic subsets over L in the
universe. In the other direction, if s is a set definable in L, then so is the
partially ordered set consisting of maps from distinct finite subsets of s to
distinct finite subsets of ω, so a L generic subset over the partial ordering
is a witness to |s| = ω.
Perhaps IFSL is not surprising since ZFC +0
# ⊢ IFSL. But the same
reasoning as led to IFSL leads to the following stronger schema, IFSAbL[r]
(For internal forcing schema for absolute class models of ZFC constructible
over an absolutely definable real) which implies that if 0# exists, then all
sets definable in L[0#] are countable.
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Definition 0.4 A subset r of ω is said to be absolutely definable if for
some Π1 formula θ(x),
1. V |= θ(r)
2. ZFC ⊢ ∃xθ(x) → ∃!xθ(x)
Definition 0.5 IFSAbL[r] is the axiom schema of set theory which says
if r is an absolutely definable real then all definable elements of L[r] are
countable (equivalently, every partial order P definable in L[r] has an L[r]
generic subset.)
The following theorem is a formal justification of IFSAbL[r].
Theorem 0.6 Suppose V is a countable transitive model of ZFC and let
{θi(x) | i < ω} be the list of all formulas defining absolute reals such that
V |=
∧
i<ω
∃xθi(x). Suppose that the supremum of the ordinals definable in
V is in V. Then there is a countable transitive extension V ′ of V with
the same ordinals such that
V ′ |= ZFC + IFSAbL[r] +
∧
i<ω
∃xθi(x)
proof Let α∗ be the sup of all the ordinals definable in L. Let P be
the set of finite partial one to one functions from α∗ to ω. Let V ′ = V [G]
where G is a V generic subset of P. To finish the proof it is enough to
prove the following claim.
Claim: If ψ(x) defines a real in M [G] then it is in M.
proof Since P is separative, if p ∈ P and pi is an automorphism of P,
then for every formula ϕ(v1, . . . , vn) and names x1, . . . , xn
∗ p  ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) iff pip  ϕ(pix1, . . . , pixn)
Let ϕ(x) = ∃Y (ψ(Y ) ∧ x ∈ Y ). Let n ∈ ω. If for no p ∈ P does
p  ||ϕ(nˇ)|| then ||ϕ(nˇ)|| = 0. So let p ∈ P such that p  ||ϕ(nˇ)||.
By ∗ if pi is an automorphism of P then pip  ||ϕ(nˇ)||. Let pi be a
permutation of ω. pi induces a permutation of P by letting for p ∈ P,
dompip = domp and letting pip(α) = pi(p(α)). By letting pi vary over the
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permutations of ω it follows that ||ϕ(nˇ)|| = 1. Let r˙ be the name with
domain {nˇ | n < ω} and such that
r˙(nˇ) = ||ϕ(nˇ)||
iG(r˙) = r, but then r = {n | ||ϕ(nˇ)|| = 1} which means it is in M.
Corollary 0.7 ZFC + IFSAbL[r]+ ’there are no absolutely definable non-
constructible reals’ is consistent. (Relative to the assumption of a countable
transitive model of L with its definable ordinals having a supremum in the
model.)
Since classes of the form L[r] are absolute if r is an absolutely definable
real, they provide reference points from which to measure the size of the
universe. We can extend the schema IFSAbL[r] by exploiting the similarity
between a class such as L(R) and a class of the form L[r] where r is an
absolutely definable real. We can argue that if P is a partial order definable
in L(R), and if a V generic subset of P cannot add any reals to V, then
an L(R) generic subset of P should exist in V. L(R) is concrete in the
sense the interpretation of L(R) is absolute in any class model containing
R , and thereby like classes of the form L[r] where r is an absolutely
definable real, L(R) provides a reference point from which to measure the
size of the universe. This leads to the following natural strengthening of
IFSL and IFSAbL[r].
Definition 0.8 x ∈ V is said to be weakly absolutely definable of the form
Vα if for some formula ψ(v) which provably defines an ordinal and which
is provably ∆1 from ZF,
V |= ∃!α
(
ψ(α) ∧ ∀y(y ∈ x ↔ ρ(x) ≤ α)
)
Let θ(x) denote ∃!α
(
ψ(α) ∧ ∀y(y ∈ x ↔ ρ(x) ≤ α)
)
and let ZFθ be a
finite part of ZF which proves ψ(v) is ∆1 and proves ψ(v) defines an
ordinal. θ(x) is said to define a weakly absolutely definable set of the form
Vα. ( ρ(x) denotes the foundation rank.)
Definition 0.9 IFSWAbL(Vα) is the axiom schema of set theory which says
for every weakly absolutely definable set of the form Vα for every partial
order P definable in L(Vα), if
||V V [G]α = V
V
α ||
(r.o.P )V = 1
4
then there exists an L(Vα) generic subset G of P.
Theorem 0.10 If there is a sequence 〈Mn | n < ω〉 of transitive models
with Mn |= ZFCn where ZFC =
⋃
n∈ω
ZFCn then Con(ZFC+IFSWAbL(Vα))
proof Let 〈θi | i < n〉 be a list of formulas defining weakly absolute sets
of the form Vα. Let {ϕij(x) | i < n, j < m, } be a set of formulas. It is
enough to show the consistency with ZFC of
∧
i<n,j<m
∃Vαi
[
θi(Vαi) ∧ ∃!Pij(L(Vα) |= ϕij(Pij)) −→
∃G(G ⊆ Pij ∧ G is L(Vαi) generic
]
Let M be a countable transitive model of enough of ZFC (including
∧
i<n
ZFθi .) Let 〈α0, . . . , αn−1〉 be the increasing sequence of ordinals such
that
M |= θi(Vαi)
for i < n. We define by induction on (i, j) ∈ n × m sets Gij . Suppose
Pij is a partial order definable in L(V
M [{Gh,l|h≤i,l<j}]
αi ) by ϕij(x) and there
exists a M [{Gh,l|h ≤ i, l < j}] generic subset of Pij not increasing
V
M [{Gh,l|h≤i,l<j}]
αi
Then let Gij be such a M [{Gh,l|h ≤ i, l < j}] subset of Pij . (If not, let
Gij = ∅. ) Let
N =M [{Gij |i < n, j < m}]
N has the property that if Pij is a partial order definable in L(Vαi) by
ϕij(x) and G is an N generic subset of Pij such that
||V N [G]αi = V
N
αi
||(r.o.P )
N
= 1
then an L(V Nαi ) generic subset of Pij exists in N.
Theorem 0.11 If 〈Mn | n < ω〉 is a sequence of transitive models with
Mn |= ZFCn where ZFC =
⋃
n∈ω
ZFCn, then Con(ZFC+ IFSWAbL[Vα]+
IFSAbL[r])
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proof Same as the last theorem except we start with a model of enough
of ZFC + IFSAbL[r].
Theorem 0.12 V [G] has no functions f : κ→ κ not in the ground model
if and only if r.o.P is (κ, κ)-distributive.
proof See [Jech1].
Corollary 0.13 IFSWAbL(Vα) is equivalent to the axiom schema of set
theory which says for every weakly absolutely definable set of the form Vα,
for every partial order P definable in L(Vα), if
(r.o.P )V is (κ, κ)-distributive
for each κ such that for some β < α, κ ≤ |Vβ|, then there exists an L(Vα)
generic subset G of P.
Theorem 0.14 ZFC + IFSWAb L(Vα) ⊢ CH
proof Let P = the set of bijections from countable ordinals into R. Since
P is σ closed, ω1 = ω
L(R)
1 , and P is a definable element of L(R), there
is an L(R) generic subset of P in V. If α is an ordinal less than ω1 and
r is a real, let Dα = {p ∈ P | α ∈ domp} and Dr = {p ∈ P | r ∈ ran p}.
For each α < ω1, G ∩Dα 6= ∅ and for each r ∈ R, G ∩Dr 6= ∅, so
⋃
G
is a bijection from ω1 to R.
Perhaps the following is a better illustration of the kind of result obtain-
able from ZFC + IFSWAb L(Vα).
Definition 0.15 A Ramsey ultrafilter on ω is an Ultrafilter on ω such
that every coloring of ω with two colors has a homogenous set in the ultra-
filter.
Theorem 0.16 ZFC + IFSWAb L(Vα) ⊢ there is a Ramsey ultrafilter on
ω.
proof Let P be the partial order (P (ω),⊆∗) where P (ω) is the power
set of ω and a ⊆∗ b means a is a subset of b except for finitely many
elements. P is definable is L(R) and is ω closed. The generic object is
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an Ramsey ultrafilter over L(R), and since all colorings of ω are in L(R),
it is a Ramsey ultrafilter over V.
One can argue that IFSWAb L(Vα) is not a natural axiom since among
the definable sets X with the property that L(X) is absolute when not
increasing X, why should you choose only those of the form Vα? But it is
natural in the sense it is a way of forcing the universe as large as possible with
respect to the existence of generics by first fixing the height of the models
under consideration and then by fixing more and more of their widths. In
any case we should consider the strengthenings of IFSWAbL(Vα) defined
below.
Definition 0.17 x ∈ V is said to be weakly absolutely definable if for some
formula ψ(x) which is provably ∆1 from ZF,
V |= ∀y(y ∈ x ↔ ψ(y))
Definition 0.18 IFS is the axiom schema of set theory which says for
every weakly absolutely definable set X, for every partial order P definable
in L(X), if
||XV [G] = XV ||(r.o.P )
V
= 1
then there exists an L(X) generic subset G of P.
If X is an weakly absolutely definable set and P is a partial ordering
definable in L(X) such that
||XV [G] = XV ||(r.o.P )
V
= 1
and if there is no L(X) generic subset of P in V, we say that V has a
gap. IFS says there are no gaps. The intuition that such gaps should not
occur in V leads to the following:
Conjecture 1 ZFC + IFS is consistent.
If ZFC + IFS is consistent, then this means that it is consistent that
the universe is complete with respect to the natural yardstick classes, (the
classes of the form L(X) where X is weakly absolutely definable.) In my
view, confirming the consistency of ZFC + IFS would be strong evidence
that the universe of set theory conforms to the axioms of IFS. One reason
for this opinion is that there is no apriori reason for the consistency of
ZFC + IFS, so if ZFC + IFS is consistent, it seems that confirmimg its
consistency would involve some deep mathematics implying IFS should be
taken seriously.
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1 Formalizing the arguments in favor of IFSL and
the other schemata
In this section we try to formalize the vague notion that IFSL is a natural
closure condition on the universe, and that gaps in general are esthetically
undesirable. For simplicity we concentrate on IFSL.
Definition 1.1 Let T be a recursive theory in the language of set theory
extending ZFC. Let P be a unary predicate. If ϕ is a formula of set
theory then ϕ∗ is ϕ with all its quantifiers restricted to P, i.e., if ∃x
occurs in ϕ then it is replaced by ∃x(P (x) ∧ . . .) and ∀x is replaced by
∀x(P (x) → . . .). The theory majorizing T, T ′, is the recursive theory in
the language {ε, P (x)} such that
1. ϕ ∈ T → ϕ∗ ∈ T ′
2. P (x) is transitive ∈ T ′
3. ∀x(x ∈ ORD → P (x)) ∈ T ′
4. ZFC ⊆ T ′
If θ(x) = ∀y(y ∈ x ↔ ψ(x)) is a formula defining a weakly absolutely
definable set then the theory majorizing T with respect to θ(x) is T ′ plus
all the axioms of the form
(
ϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕn → (ψ(y)↔ ∃zψ0(y, z)↔ ∀zψ1(y, z))
)
−→
(
∀y(ψ(y) → P (y))
)
where ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ∈ ZF and ψ0(y, z) and ψ1(y, z) are ∆0 formulas.
Theorem 1.2 Let T be a recursive extension of ZFC. Let T =
⋃
n∈ω
Tn
where for some recursive function F, for each n, F (n) = Tn, a finite
subset of T and the Tn are increasing. If there is a sequence 〈Mn | n < ω〉
of countable transitive models such that
Mn |= Tn
then T ′ + IFSL ( T
′ is the theory majorizing T ) is consistent and there
is a sequence 〈Nn | n ∈ ω〉 of countable transitive models such that
Nn |= T
′
n
where T ′ =
⋃
n∈ω
T ′n and for some recursive function H, for each n ∈ ω,
H(n) = T ′n a finite subset of T
′.
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proof Let IFSL =
⋃
n∈ω
(IFSL)n where for each n ∈ ω, (IFSL)n is
finite. We can find a subsequence 〈Nn | n ∈ ω〉 of the 〈Mn | n ∈ ω〉
and Nn -generic sets Gn such that Nn[Gn] |= (IFSL)n, Nn |= Tn. Let
Nn[Gn]
∗ be the model in the language {ε, P (x)} obtained by letting the
interpretation of P (x) to be Nn. Let D be an ultrafilter on ω. Then
∏
Nn[Gn]
∗/D
is a model for T ′ + IFSL.
Definition 1.3 A theory extending ZFC is ω−complete if whenever ϕ(x)
is a formula of set theory and if for each natural number n,
T ⊢ ϕ(n)
then T ⊢ ∀n ∈ ωϕ(n).
Theorem 1.4 Let T be a recursive extension of ZFC and suppose it has
a consistent, complete and ω−complete extension T ∗. Then T ′+ IFSL is
consistent.
proof By reflection in T ∗, by its ω−completeness and by the axiom of
choice in T ∗,
T ∗ ⊢ ∃〈Nn | n ∈ ω〉
with the 〈Nn | n ∈ ω〉 having the same properties as in the previous
theorem. As in the previous theorem since ZFC ⊂ T, T ∗ ⊢ Con(T ′ +
IFSL). Since T
∗ is ω−complete, (by the omitting types theorem) it has
an model M with the standard set of integers. Since M |= T ∗,
M |= Con(T ′ + IFSL)
and as Con(T ′+IFSL) is an arithmetical statement, it must really be true.
Certainly if the hypothesis of the theorem fails, then T cannot be a suitable
axiom system for set theory.
Definition 1.5 If θ(x) is a formula defining an weakly absolutely definable
set, then IFS ↾ θ(x) is IFS restricted to the set defined by θ(x), i.e.,
it says for all partial orders P definable in L(X) were X is defined by
θ(x) such that
||XV [G] = XV ||(r.o.P )
V
= 1
there is an L(X) generic subset of P.
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Theorem 1.6 Let θ(x) be a formula defining an weakly absolutely defin-
able set. Let T be a recursive extension of ZFC and suppose it has a con-
sistent, complete and ω−complete extension T ∗. Then T ′
θ(x)+ IFS ↾ θ(x)
is consistent.
proof Same as above.
Theorem 1.7 Let θ(x) be a formula defining an weakly absolutely defin-
able set. Let T be a recursive extension of ZFC+IFS ↾ θ(x) and suppose
T ′θ(x) majorizes T with respect to θ(x). Then T
′
θ(x) ⊢ IFS ↾ θ(x).
proof Working in T ′ the generics in the inner model are still generic over
L(X) since the inner model is a transitive class containing all the ordinals.
The theorems in this section are meant as the formalization of the notion
that we can ’consistently imagine’ a class model of ZFC not satisfying
IFSL as being contained in a larger class satisfying ZFC + IFSL, and
that models of ZFC not satisfying IFS have a gap.
2 Conclusion
These axiom schemata lead to many questions, among them
1. Are there models of IFS or IFSWAbL[Vα] which are forcing exten-
sions of L ?
2. Are there similar natural schema’s making the universe large, but con-
tradicting IFS or IFSWAbL[Vα]?
3. What are the consequences for ordinary mathematics of these axioms?
The conventional view of the history of set theory says that Godel in 1938
proved that the consistency of ZF implies the consistency of ZFC and
of ZFC+GCH, and that Cohen with the invention of forcing proved that
Con(ZF ) implies Con(ZF + ¬AC) and Con(ZFC + ¬GCH) but from
the point of view of IFSL a better way to state the history would be to
say that Godel discovered L and Cohen proved there are many generic sets
over L.
I think confirming the consistency of IFS with ZFC would be a vin-
dication of the idea that generics over partial orders definable in L(X) with
X an weakly absolutely definable set exist, and thereby put a crack in the
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armor surrounding the continuim hypothesis as ZFC+IFS ↾ R ⊢ CH. On
the other hand, if ZFC+IFS is not consistent, it would show the universe
must have some gaps, i.e., incomplete with respect to some concrete set, an
esthetically unpleasing result. It is ironic that although mathematics and
especially mathematical logic is an art noted for its precise and formalized
reasoning, it seems that in order to solve problems at the frontiers of logic’s
foundations we must tackle questions of an esthetic nature.
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